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Fasano: Confrontation Clause

THE DECLINE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
IN NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Encarnacion1
(decided June 23, 2011)
A jury convicted Samuel Encarnacion of second-degree murder, attempted murder, and assault and sentenced him to twenty years
to life.2 Encarnacion appealed the trial court‟s decision, claiming his
constitutional right to confront a witness under the Sixth Amendment3 was violated through the prosecution‟s use of a grand jury testimony in its case-in-chief from a witness who refused to testify at
trial.4 Additionally, he alleged that the testimony of a DNA analyst,
who did not personally conduct the DNA tests in which she was testifying to, violated his right to confront a witness.5 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the lower court finding that the defendant‟s misconduct “induced [the witness‟s] refusal to testify at
trial”6 and that the DNA results are “non-identifying raw data” that
“shed no light on the guilt of the accused.”7

1

926 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2011).
Id. at 457.
3
The Supreme Court makes the “[Sixth Amendment] obligatory upon the States.” Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)).
4
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
5
Id. at 454.
6
Id. at 453.
7
Id. (citing People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. 2009)). In the alternative, the
First Department held that if an error were made in admitting the testimony of the witness or
the testimony of the DNA analyst, then such an error would nevertheless be harmless due to
the weight of the evidence. Id. at 454.
2

929
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FACTS

On January 20, 2005, police responded to a 911 call at an
apartment building in Bronx, New York.8 In the lobby, police met
with Encarnacion and were directed to apartment 8J.9 In the apartment, police discovered Ofelia Torres, Encarnacion‟s girlfriend, on
the floor of the apartment with numerous stab wounds.10 The police
also discovered Ofelia‟s cousin, Johnny Torres, dead on the floor
with numerous stab wounds.11 In the compactor room of the apartment building, police discovered a garbage bag filled with “a pair of
sweat pants, a white t-shirt, a pair of jeans, and a pair of sneakers.”12
In addition to the clothing in the bag, police also found bloody
knives.13 The bag found was similar to other bags found in Encarnacion‟s apartment building.14 A doctor later asked Ofelia who her attacker was, and Ofelia verbally responded that it was Encarnacion.15
Before Ofelia could testify at trial, she had stopped cooperating with the prosecution and refused to testify against Encarnacion.16
The prosecution informed the court that it intended to use Ofelia‟s
grand jury testimony against the defendant.17 The trial court then
held a Sirois18 hearing to determine if Encarnacion‟s misconduct
caused Ofelia‟s refusal to cooperate.19
At the Sirois hearing, Ofelia‟s mother, Nancy Torres, testified
that after the crime occurred, Encarnacion began to call Ofelia both at
Nancy‟s home and on Ofelia‟s cell phone.20 The number of calls to
Nancy‟s home was in excess of 1,000 times.21 She also testified to
8

Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 453.
17
Id.
18
At a Sirois hearing, before an out of court statement is allowed in a case-in-chief, the
trial court must determine if the prosecution has shown “the defendant‟s misconduct by clear
and convincing evidence” induced a witness not to testify against the defendant. Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
19
Id. at 453.
20
Id.
21
Id.
9
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the content of one of these telephone calls, in which she overheard
Ofelia and Encarnacion discuss how to change Ofelia‟s testimony so
Encarnacion would receive less time in prison.22 After the conversation that Nancy described, the prosecution noted that Ofelia‟s testimony had changed from the one she gave to the grand jury.23 Now
she accused Johnny of stabbing her.24 Upon Ofelia being hospitalized, she changed her story back to that of the grand jury testimony
and admitted the defendant told her to lie.25
Nancy further testified that Ofelia told her that Encarnacion
was the one who told her to change the story so he would get out of
jail quicker.26 Next, Ofelia told Nancy that her reasoning for refusing
to cooperate was because Encarnacion, “through his friends,” told
Ofelia that if she “comes in [to testify] he would get her.”27
At the conclusion of the Sirois hearing, the trial court then
permitted the prosecution to use grand jury testimony of Ofelia in its
case-in-chief, holding that Encarnacion‟s improper influence on Ofelia caused her refusal to testify.28 On appeal, Encarnacion argued that
the prosecution violated his constitutional right to confront a witness
against him because the prosecution had not sufficiently proven that
his misconduct had caused the witness‟s unavailability at trial.29 The
First Department upheld the trial court‟s holding, concluding, “clearly and convincingly,” that the evidence had shown that Encarnacion,
through fear, had caused the witness‟s refusal to testify.30
At trial, “the prosecution offered testimony from Danielle
Coye, a forensic scientist employed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner[,] . . . [who] personally performed the DNA testing on
all . . . [the] items from the crime scene . . . [w]ith the exception of a
pair of jeans, sneakers and socks.”31 She testified from her notes and
the exhibits in evidence regarding not only the tests she personally

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 456.
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performed, but also from tests she had not performed.32
A.

First Department’s Analysis of the Sirois Hearing

The court began its analysis by discussing the differences between the state and federal approach to defining misconduct.33 The
court emphasized New York‟s broader definition of misconduct over
its federal counterpart, stating that New York‟s definition of misconduct includes “intimidation[,] . . . bribery, threats, and the use of a relationship to improperly procure a witness‟s silence.”34
Next, the court looked at Nancy‟s testimony from the Sirois
hearing, focusing specifically on the portion in which she testified
that “Ofelia told her [that Encarnacion] through his friends, told Ofelia that if she comes in, [he] would get her.”35 The court noted that
this statement implicitly showed that Encarnacion had threatened
Ofelia and caused her silence.36 From this, the court stated that because Encarnacion caused Ofelia‟s refusal to testify, he had lost his
right to confront her, and therefore, the use of her grand jury minutes
against him were proper.37 Finally, regarding the evidence standard
of the Sirois evidence, the court held that clearly and convincingly it
had been shown that Encarnacion through his threats had caused the
witness fear that prevented her from testifying.38
32

Id.
See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 452 (comparing the federal approach to the state‟s
approach on defining misconduct).
34
Id. (citations omitted) (citing People v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1999)).
35
Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 458. In disagreement, the concurring opinion wrote:
Even putting aside that on cross-examination [Nancy] repeatedly stated
that her daughter had told her that an alleged friend, not friends, of defendant had made such a statement, this seems too slender a reed to support the conclusion that the People proved defendant‟s responsibility for
such a threat by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 459 (McGuire, J., concurring).
Moreover, the concurring opinion did not agree that there was even a threat made. See
id. at 458 (“To repeat, there is no credible evidence that defendant knew about, condoned or
encouraged the alleged threat.”). The concurring opinion stated that Nancy‟s testimony was
an “in-court statement . . . [made] about an out-of-court statement her daughter assertedly
made about an out-of-court statement assertedly made by unidentified persons about an outof-court statement assertedly made by defendant.” Id. at 459. From this, the concurring
opinion stated, “Any conclusion that this is competent evidence would be at least a contro33
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FEDERAL COURTS’ APPROACH TO WAIVER OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT’S RIGHTS

The Supreme Court case of Illinois v. Allen39 provides the
guidelines regarding waiver of a defendant‟s confrontation rights.40
There, the Supreme Court held that a defendant through misconduct
could lose his right to be present at trial.41 In Allen, the defendant,
repeatedly and after numerous warnings from the trial judge, continued to act in an abusive and disrespectful manner that interfered with
his trial.42 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
to consider whether there was a violation of the Confrontation
Clause.43
The Court refused to make the Confrontation Clause absolute
where there is “flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary
standards of proper conduct.”44 The Court also quoted Justice Cardozo: “No doubt the privilege of [personally confronting witnesses]
may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.”45 In direct
disagreement with the Seventh Circuit, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment‟s Confrontation Clause is not absolute, and as such, it
can be lost by a defendant‟s misconduct.46
The Second Circuit in United States v. Mastrangelo,47 expanded on the misconduct exception to the Confrontation Clause by
versial one.” Id. Furthermore, the concurring opinion notes that the majority did not cite to
any “precedent supporting its implicit position that such an extended chain of out-of-court
statements by unidentified persons is not only competent evidence but evidence that can play
a decisive role in satisfying the prosecution‟s burden to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.” Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
39
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
40
See id. at 346-47 (holding that the trial judge did not commit any legal error removing
the defendant from his own trial); see also Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U.S. 97, 121-22
(1934) (holding that a defendant did not have a right to visit the scene of the crime with the
jury); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458-59 (1912) (holding that the defendant waived
his right to be present at trial when he consented for the trial to proceed without him).
41
Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43.
42
Id. at 339-41. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the defendant by his conduct had
“relinquished his constitutional right to be present.” Id. at 341.
43
Id. at 338.
44
Id. at 343.
45
Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934),
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
46
See id. (holding “that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial” through his
misconduct).
47
693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
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including waiver of a defendant‟s right to confront a witness if the
defendant uses chicanery,48 threats,49 murder, or violence to procure a
witness‟s silence.50 In Mastrangelo, the purchase of four trucks
linked the defendant to the crime, with only one witness of that purchase.51 At grand jury, the witness testified that he sold the trucks to
the defendant.52 Parts of a recorded conversation between the witness
and defendant could reasonably be understood as threats to prevent
the witness from testifying against the person who purchased the
trucks.53 On the day the witness was to testify at trial, two men shot
him.54 After a mistrial, the prosecution sought to introduce the witness‟s prior grand jury testimony, which the trial court allowed.55
The Second Circuit affirmed the use of the prior grand jury
testimony, stating that if the defendant had played a part in the witness‟s refusal to testify, he would have waived any confrontation
clause objections against the admittance of the witness‟s testimony.56
The court further stated that a person, in both criminal and civil trials,
cannot take advantage of a wrong he has committed.57
Next, the court had to determine the appropriate burden of
proof for waiver hearings in a federal court.58 The court stated the
prosecution has the burden; however, it was unclear on the appropriate burden.59 While the court in United States v. Balano60 used a
“preponderance of the evidence” test, the court in United States v.
Thevis61 applied a higher standard of “clear and convincing.”62 The
Second Circuit held that the burden of proof in a waiver hearing
48

Id. at 272-73 (citing United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1975)).
Id. (citing United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1979)).
50
Id. (citing United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1975)).
51
Id. at 271.
52
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 271.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 271-72.
56
Id. at 272.
57
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 271 (quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458
(1912)).
58
See id. at 273.
59
Id.
60
618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979).
61
665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
62
See Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (comparing the evidentiary standard set out in Balano, to the standard set out in Thevis).
49
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where there is misconduct would be “by a preponderance of the evidence.”63 The court in its reasoning, noted that there is a difference
between the Confrontation Clause and waiver by misconduct, thereby
allowing different burdens of proof.64 Consequently, the lower evidentiary standard of preponderance of the evidence satisfied the
court.65
Having established the burden of proof, the court remanded
the case to the district court to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence, if the defendant was involved in the witness‟s murder.66 If
so, he waived his rights under the Confrontation Clause.67 In addition, the court stated, “Bare knowledge of a plot to kill [the witness]
and a failure to give warning to appropriate authorities is sufficient to
constitute a waiver.”68
III.

NEW YORK’S HOLLOW HEIGHTENED EVIDENTIARY
STANDARD FOR WAIVER HEARINGS

The New York State Court of Appeals defined misconduct
more broadly than its federal counterpart,69 and it began with an expressly higher standard on its Confrontation Clause waiver hearings.70 The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Geraci,71 extended the definition of misconduct in New York to include
intimidation and bribery72 and required the evidence at a waiver hearing to be “clear and convincing,” which affords a greater protection
to the defendant than in federal court.73 The court held that grand
jury testimony may be used against a defendant where it has been

63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 273-74
67
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273-74.
68
Id.
69
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
70
Compare Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (setting out a preponderance of the evidence
standard), with People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995) (setting out a clear and
convincing standard for the state of New York).
71
649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995).
72
Id. at 824.
73
Compare Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (setting out a preponderance of the evidence
standard), with Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 822 (setting out a clear and convincing standard for
the state of New York).
64
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shown that the defendant induced the witness‟s unavailability.74
In Geraci, a witness‟s grand jury testimony supplied the main
evidence in an indictment of the defendant.75 After the witness‟s
grand jury testimony, but before trial, the witness abruptly left his job
and family to move out of state.76 The prosecution then learned that
the witness no longer wished to testify and sought a Sirois hearing to
use the witness‟s grand jury testimony against the defendant at trial.77
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the decision, stating
that a factfinder could clearly and convincingly conclude from the
evidence and the inferences drawn from that evidence that the defendant had played a part in the witness‟s unavailability.78 Further noting, that the conclusions reached by the trial court rested on “concrete
facts.”79
In support of its holding that the clear and convincing standard had been met, the court noted first that there was evidence
showing the motive and opportunity of the defendant.80 Specifically,
the defendant being out on bail for months prior to trial gave him opportunity to intimidate the witness.81 Furthermore, a fact finder could
conclude from the evidence before it that there was a strong motive
for the defendant to cause the witness not to testify.82 The evidence
supported the inference that the defendant was aware of the witness‟s
value to the prosecution and the witness‟s lack of cooperation with

74

Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 821.
Id. at 819.
76
Id.
77
Id. At the hearing, two police investigators testified that the defendant had made contact with the witness, seeking to have him come speak to the defendant‟s lawyer. Id. The
investigators also revealed that the witness called them from Florida to tell them that he was
aware that the defendant had a copy of his testimony, and the witness expressed fear not only
for himself, but also for his family because if he testified he would end up in trouble. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 819. The investigators also stated that the witness told them that a friend of
the witness had stopped people coming to break the witness‟s legs. Id. Additionally, the
investigators testified that the witness was now receiving money from the defendant‟s uncle
after an unidentified friend of the witness had spoken with the uncle. Id. at 819-20. After
this attempted bribery is when investigators realized that the witness had altered his original
testimony, and now claims he never saw the stabbing. Id. The trial court allowed the grand
jury testimony in place of the witness‟s live testimony. Id. at 820.
78
Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 824.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 823.
81
Id.
82
Id.
75
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the defense.83
Second, the court noted that there was evidence that an unknown person confronted the witness and that he showed a copy of
the witness‟s accusation against the defendant.84 Third, the witness‟s
actual statements to the investigators showed that his intimidation
was attributed to the defendant.85 The statements by the witness to
the investigators logically showed that the defendant caused the witness‟s fear.86 Those statements also showed the “fear and resentment” that the witness felt against the defendant.87 Lastly, the defendant‟s likelihood of involvement was dramatically multiplied when
the witness at the hearing testified that the defendant‟s uncle had offered him more than $10,000 to remain silent. 88 It was this financial
arrangement that the court noted, “directly benefitted” the defendant,
and therefore, it was a reason to find that the defendant had used intimidation or bribery in procuring the witness‟s silence.89
The New York Court of Appeals seemingly hollowed out the
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing for a Sirois hearing
when it decided People v. Cotto.90 In Cotto, the prosecution‟s key
witness, who was going to identify the defendant as the shooter, unexpectedly phoned the prosecutor and refused to testify at trial due to
fear for himself and his family.91 The prosecution then noted that the
witness informed them that his life might be in jeopardy after several
men approached him and his family.92
Subsequently, the court ordered a Sirois hearing to determine
if the defendant through intimidation had induced the witness not to
testify.93 An officer testified at the hearing that the witness‟s fiancé
was fearful for her and her child, after a man asked the witness‟s
83

Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 823.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 823-24.
89
Id. at 824.
90
699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998); see also Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 233 (2d Cir.
2003) (regarding Cotto, 699 N.E.2d 394, the Second Circuit on habeas corpus appeal stated
that a de novo review of the case may lead to find that the evidence “was insufficient to permit the admission of the out-of-court statements”).
91
Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 396.
92
Id.
93
Id.
84
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mother and sister about the witness‟s whereabouts.94 In addition, a
detective testified at the hearing that the witness‟s sister said several
unidentified people had asked her about the witness‟s specific whereabouts in jail.95 The sister also told the detective that there was
“word on the street” that her brother had talked.96 The mother of the
witness also testified, which corroborated the sister‟s testimony.97
The trial court held that the prosecution had shown, by a clear and
convincing standard, the use of misconduct to induce a witness‟s silence.98
The Court of Appeals, in agreement with the trial court, held
that sufficient evidence existed to show that the threats against the
witness had scared him into silence.99 In its reasoning, the court
noted that the testimony of the two police officers regarding the out
of court statements made by the witness, as well as the interviews of
the witness‟s sister and mother, showed the witness had been ready to
identify the defendant but was now scared into not testifying.100 Even
though the witness denied that threats were ever made against him,
the court ruled in favor of the police officers in this credibility
clash.101 For this, the court looked at the trial court judge‟s observation that the witness at the Sirois hearing “appeared to be anxious,
uncomfortable and forced in his responses, a demeanor inconsistent
with truthfulness and consistent with a state of mind demonstrating
fear of harm to his family or to himself if he should testify against
[the defendant].”102
The court also held that the evidence sufficiently linked the
threats to the defendant.103 First, the defendant knew the witness
from his small neighborhood.104 Additionally, at the time of the
threats, the defendant was out on bail and had the ability to make the
94

Id. at 397.
Id.
96
Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 397.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 398. But see id. at 404 (Smith, J., dissenting) (concluding that the evidence from
the Sirois hearing of “unnamed individuals” who allegedly approached the witness‟s family,
along with “word on the street,” did not meet the clear and convincing standard).
100
Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398 (majority opinion).
101
Id.
102
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103
Id.
104
Id.
95
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threats.105 Moreover, the timing of the threats was important to the
court‟s analysis as well, because immediately after it was revealed
that the witness could implicate the defendant, the witness began to
receive the threats.106 This gave the “defendant uniquely good reason
to want to intimidate [the witness]—and there was no suggestion that
anyone else stood to gain from the witness‟s silence.”107 Lastly, the
court noted that the defendant, at the time of the shooting, had previously threatened the witness when he pointed his gun at the witness.108 The court concluded that the prosecution had met the clear
and convincing standard, and therefore, it could use the witness‟s out
of court statements against the defendant.109
IV.

COMPARISON

The Appellate Division, First Department, in Encarnacion
appears to have further lowered the evidentiary standard required in
Sirois hearings, in its department. It did this in a case where it was
not even necessary to decide the issue of whether the evidence met
the burden.110 Accordingly, the evidence in Encarnacion does not
even rise to the reduced levels of clear and convincing that Cotto required.111
The court in Encarnacion relied heavily on the testimony of a
biased mother, whose daughter was a victim of a heinous crime.112
105

Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398.
See id. (stating that the threats began when it was revealed to the defendant that the
witness could implicate him).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. The dissent disagrees with the majority‟s holding that the evidence links the defendant to the witness‟s unavailability. Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 404 (Smith, J., dissenting). The
dissent stated:
There is no proof that a “contract” existed on the witness. There is no
proof that the defendant or anyone acting on his behalf ever spoke to the
witness‟s sister. Although defendant was out on bail, there is no proof
that he or anyone associated with him made any contact with the witness.
Id.
110
See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 457 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that the majority knows it does not have to resolve this issue but does so nonetheless).
111
See id. at 458 (“[T]here is no credible evidence that defendant knew about, condoned
or encouraged the alleged threat.”).
112
See id. at 454 (majority opinion) (using only Nancy‟s testimony to describe how the
106
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This differs drastically from what the courts in Geraci and Cotto relied on in making their decisions. In Geraci, the court relied primarily on the testimony of police and the actual witness in reaching its
holding.113 In that case, the investigators‟ meetings with the witness
and witness‟s actual testimony revealed that the defendant had come
in contact with the witness and that the defendant‟s uncle was paying
off the witness.114 In Cotto, the court took the word of the police over
the other witnesses in the Sirois hearing, finding credibility issues
with the witness‟s family.115 However, in Encarnacion, the key testimony provided at the hearing was that of the victim‟s own mother.116 Foregoing the obvious bias a mother would have against the
man she believed conducted a vicious and savage crime against her
daughter, and that Nancy contradicted her own testimony,117 the only
other witness at the hearing was a detective who testified that Ofelia
told him that she was still in love with the defendant, she refused to
testify against him, and that she hopes he “gets out.”118
The alleged 1,000 phone calls from the defendant to the witness and the phone conversation between them does not provide
enough evidence, either on its own or combined with other evidence,
to rise to the level of clear and convincing.119 In Geraci, the court
found actual evidence of misconduct in the payment of the witness,120
which differs strongly from merely finding a large number of phone
calls from the defendant to the witness. In Cotto, the court saw that
clear and convincing burden was met).
113
See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 819 (noting only the testimony of two investigators and the
witness as testifying at the Sirois hearing).
114
Id. at 819-820 (making reference to a meeting between an investigator and witness
about a friend who had come in contact with the defendant‟s uncle).
115
See Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398 (noting a “credibility clash” between the police and witness‟s family that was resolved in favor of the police by the trial judge).
116
See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that only two
witnesses actually testified at the Sirois hearing, while the police officer‟s testimony provided “little if anything”).
117
See id. (noting that Nancy on cross, stated “that the defendant had never threatened
[Ofelia],” and “testified that Ofelia had said that a friend, not friends, of defendant had made
such a statement to her”).
118
Id.
119
See id. at 460 (stating that the number of phone calls had “little or no probative value”).
120
See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 824 (“The existence of a financial arrangement made by
defendant‟s uncle that directly benefitted defendant was certainly a circumstance that bore
directly on whether the intimidation and bribery had been initiated or approved by defendant.”).
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the timing of threats coincided with the timing of the witness and defendant meeting one another.121 This too is different from merely receiving phone calls after a crime. Encarnacion was in prison and accused of a viscous crime, so it is more than reasonable that he would
want to contact his girlfriend. Arguably, if Encarnacion‟s side of the
phone conversation were to be overheard and revealed that he was attempting to induce Ofelia not to testify, then the sheer number of
phone calls would most likely rise to the level of clear and convincing. However, Nancy only testified to Ofelia‟s side of the conversation.122 More so, the trial court‟s findings do not indicate that the
conversation between Ofelia and Encarnacion, to which Nancy testified to, even took place.123
Finally, the court in Encarnacion found through Nancy‟s testimony that the defendant, through his friends, threatened Ofelia.124
However, Nancy‟s testimony was inconsistent throughout the hearing.125 The statement, regarding the defendant‟s friends threatening
the witness, ultimately comes “down to an in-court statement by
[Nancy] about an out-of-court statement her daughter assertedly
made about an out-of-court statement assertedly made by unidentified
persons about an out-of-court statement assertedly made by the defendant.”126 Allowing such statements into evidence is questionable.127
The First Department, in furtherance of the Cotto decision,
continued to lower the evidentiary standards required to meet the
clear and convincing standard in a Sirois hearing. The court in Encarnacion sacrificed the confrontation protections that should have
been afforded to Encarnacion through inconsistent and vague testimony. Trial courts in the First Department will now feel compelled
to continue the trend of their higher courts and further lower the re121

Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398.
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (McGuire, J., concurring).
123
See id. (regarding Nancy‟s testimony between Ofelia and Encarnacion, the concurrence
noted that “[t]he trial court‟s written opinion does not mention such a discussion,” nor does it
even show that the conversation had occurred).
124
Id. at 454 (majority opinion).
125
See id. at 458 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that Nancy changed her testimony
several times to friends, including saying that the defendant never threatened the witness,
and that there was only one friend, not multiple, who made the threats).
126
Id. at 458-59.
127
See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59 (“Any conclusion that this is competent evidence would be at least a controversial one.”).
122
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quired evidentiary standard. Although the evidentiary standard required in Sirois hearings remains expressly clear and convincing, the
evidence required to meet that threshold has clearly diminished.
V.

DNA AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The defendant in this case, on appeal, objected to a witness
being allowed to testify against him, using DNA tests that the witness
had not personally conducted.128 The First Department declined review of this issue because it was not specifically objected to on the
same grounds raised on appeal.129 However, the court rejected it on
the merits in an alternative holding.130
To begin its analysis, the court in Encarnacion first determined whether DNA analysis was testimonial.131 The court noted
that the Supreme Court of the United States defined testimonial as,
“ „[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.‟ ”132 As per the rule set down by the
Supreme Court, “if the statement is testimonial it cannot be used unless the declarant is unavailable at trial and the defendant has had an
opportunity to cross-examine the same prior to trial.”133
In comparing DNA test results to that of other laboratory results, the court in Encarnacion stated, “The admission in evidence of
documents evincing the results of laboratory testing performed on
narcotics recovered from a criminal defendant, without concomitantly
producing those who performed the testing at trial, violates the Confrontation Clause.”134 Continuing its analogy to other types of lab reports, the court noted that “reports evincing the results of fingerprint
analysis performed on a defendant‟s fingerprints and those recovered
at the scene of a crime, without producing the person who performed
the analysis both invokes and violates the Confrontation Clause.”135
128

Id. at 454 (majority opinion).
Id.
130
Id. at 454-55.
131
Id. at 455.
132
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)) (alteration in original).
133
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 455 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct.
2527, 2531 (2009)).
134
Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531).
135
Id. (citing People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1033 (N.Y. 2008)).
129
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The court differentiated DNA results from other lab test results by
holding that DNA tests “contain non-identifying raw data . . . and
thus, standing alone, and in the absence of expert opinion linking the
results to the defendant, shed no light on the guilt of the accused.”136
Therefore, the court held that a DNA analyst can testify regarding a
DNA analysis in which he or she did not personally conduct.137
A.

Federal DNA

The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington,138 established
the initial guidelines for determining if testimony regarding DNA
analysis by a person who did not personally perform the test violated
the Confrontation Clause.139 In Crawford, the prosecution sought to
use a tape-recorded statement of the defendant‟s wife without the defendant‟s ability to cross-examine her.140 The Court, through looking
at the history of the Confrontation Clause, found that the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment supported two inferences.141 The first “principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”142 Second, the
Framers believed that testimonial statements of a witness should not
be used against a defendant unless there was a previous opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.143 Next, the Court defined the term testimony by applying its dictionary meaning, “ „[a] solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.‟ ”144 Therefore, the Court stated, “An accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
136

Id. at 456 (citing People v Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. 2009)).
Id.
138
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
139
Id. at 42. A jury convicted the defendant of assault after a Washington State trial court
allowed the prosecution to play for the jury a tape-recorded statement of the defendant‟s wife
“to the police describing the stabbing, even though he had no opportunity for crossexamination.” Id. at 38.
140
Id. at 42.
141
Id. at 47-50.
142
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
143
Id. at 53-54.
144
Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)) (alteration in original).
137

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 27

944

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

not.”145 The Court in this part of its analysis defined the differences
between statements that are testimonial and those that are nontestimonial, by creating three classes of testimonial statements:
(1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially;
(2) extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; and
(3) statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial.146
Because the prosecution admitted the witness‟s testimonial statement
against the defendant and gave no opportunity for cross-examination,
the Court held that there was a violation of the defendant‟s Sixth
Amendment rights.147
The Supreme Court broadened the definition of testimonial
when it decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts148 and held that certificates of analysis are testimonial.149 In Melendez-Diaz, a Massachusetts trial court found the defendant guilty of drug related charges
after admitting into evidence three certificates of analysis showing
the substance in the defendant‟s possession had been cocaine.150 Pursuant to Massachusetts law, the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health was required to have the certificates notarized and sworn to by
their analysts.151 The defendant objected to the introduction of the
certificates, asserting that analysts were now required to testify in
person after the ruling in Crawford.152 Both the appellate and su145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id. at 51-52 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Id. at 2531-32.
Id. at 2530-31.
Id. at 2531.
Id.
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preme courts in Massachusetts rejected the defendant‟s claim that his
Sixth Amendment right had been violated.153
The Supreme Court held that the certificates of analysis were
actually affidavits and thus, “were testimonial statements[] and the
analysts were „witnesses‟ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and
that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to „be confronted with‟ the analysts at trial.”154 In
referring to the “core class of testimonial statements” the Court laid
out in Crawford, the Court stated that the documents in this case
caused little doubt that they fall within those classes and thus, “are
quite plainly affidavits.”155
After Encarnacion was decided in New York, the United
States Supreme Court decided an important case regarding forensic
analysts used to convict a defendant of aggravated DWI in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.156 In Bullcoming, the defendant, after a DWI arrest, had a forensic laboratory report used against him at trial, which
stated that his blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit.157 The
prosecution, instead of calling to the stand the person who signed the
actual certification, called a different analyst who was familiar with
the methods used by the laboratory, but had not actually taken part in
the analysis used against the defendant.158
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the Confrontation Clause allowed the introduction of a forensic laboratory report by an analyst who did not personally perform,
observe, or certify the forensic laboratory test.159 The Court reiterated its holding from Crawford and stated that an out-of-court testimonial statement may not be used against a defendant at trial unless
the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the
witness and the witness is unavailable.160 The Court in its reasoning
stated that the analyst‟s certification “reported more than a machine153

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
Id. at 2532 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
155
Id.
156
131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
157
Id. at 2709.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 2713.
160
Id. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713.
154

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 27

946

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

generated number.”161 The analyst had, in fact, certified to receiving
the defendant‟s blood sample with an unbroken seal, that he checked
that the sample number and report number matched, and that he followed proper protocol.162 From this, the Court stated, “These representations, relating to past events and human actions not revealed in
raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination.”163
B.

New York and DNA

Prior to Melendez-Diaz, the New York Court of Appeals decided the case People v. Meekins164 and held that DNA data generated
by a private lab was not testimonial in nature.165 In Meekins, the defendant was convicted by jury trial of sodomy and sexual abuse in the
first-degree, along with robbery in the third-degree.166 The prosecution at trial introduced a private laboratory‟s DNA report of samples
from the victim‟s rape kit.167

161

Id. at 2714.
Id.
163
Id.
164
884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008).
165
Id. at 1034.
166
Id. at 1024.
167
Id. To testify regarding this report, the prosecution called “two experts in DNA analysis and forensic biology: Judith Floyd, employed by Gene Screen, the private laboratory, and
Kyra Keblish, employed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, neither of whom personally performed the actual testing.” Id. In the testimony of Floyd, she:
[T]estified that she supervised the technicians who performed the testing
in this case and performed a final review of their results[,] . . . [and she]
explained that the lab issued a statement in its report indicating that a
DNA profile originated from a male [that] was obtained from the sperm
fraction of the oral swab in the rape kit and that the lab didn‟t do any
comparisons of the results, but instead sent the report to the Medical Examiner‟s office for that task.
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Next, Keblish testified that her office received the “raw data,” and from that she “interpreted the graphical data by „wean[ing] out what peaks might not be DNA, because there
are times that peaks will show up in the data that are not actually . . . DNA alleles or DNA
peaks.‟ ” Id. at 1025 (alteration in original). Subsequently, Keblish matched the defendant‟s
DNA to that of the sample. Id. She also testified “that the DNA report and related files were
prepared in the regular course of business of the medical examiner‟s office and its contracted
agencies.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The First Department held that the DNA
report was actually a business record and “business records are by their nature . . . not testimonial”; therefore, the court affirmed the decision. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
162
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The New York Court of Appeals held that the DNA report
was “not directly accusatory” and therefore, admissible.168 In its reasoning, the court stated that the DNA report contained “raw data
[that] was in the form of non[-]identifying graphical information.”169
Therefore, because the lab company “did not determine whether the
data it collected matched [defendant] or any other suspect . . . and
[did not] do any comparisons of the results,” any results from the
DNA tests “shed no light on the guilt of the accused in the absence of
an expert‟s opinion.”170 The court—in admitting that the analysts
could have made errors in the testing procedures itself—noted that
allowing subsequent reviewers, who are familiar with the laboratory‟s protocol, the ability to verify another analyst‟s work under oath
will allow a proper cross-examination to show that proper protocol
was followed.171 Therefore, the court affirmed the decision and ruled
that DNA reports were not testimonial.172
Despite the Court‟s decision in Melendez-Diaz, the New York
Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion in People v. Brown.173
In Brown, the defendant raped a nine-year old girl and struck her on
the head with a brick when she resisted.174 When the victim awoke,
she was brought to the hospital and was given “a rape kit that was
later sent to [Office of the Chief Medical Examiner].”175 Based on an
analysis by a lab technician at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”), it was determined that the profiles were a match
occurring in one out of one trillion males.”176 The OCME witness
168

Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1035.
Id. at 1034.
170
Id. at 1035.
171
Id.
172
See id. (affirming the decision of the trial court).
173
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931.
174
Id. at 928.
175
Id. The rape kit was not processed until “almost nine-years after the crime,” due to a
backlog. Id. at 928. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) “sent the rape
kit, along with 225 others, to Bode Technology, one of at least three of its subcontracting
laboratories, for testing.” Id. at 928-29. The lab produced a “DNA report containing machine-generated raw data, graphs and charts” and “isolated a male DNA specimen from the
rape kit.” Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 929. Maryland police during a routine search of a DNA
data bank “registered a cold hit, linking defendant‟s DNA to the profile found in the victim‟s
rape kit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). At the OCME, “a forensic biologist/criminalist . . . compared defendant‟s DNA characteristics to the specimen from the victim‟s rape kit.” Id.
176
Id.
169
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testified that the DNA report she received from laboratory:
[C]onsisted merely of raw data and contained no conclusions other than noting that there was a male specimen found in the victim‟s rape kit[,] . . . [and] [s]he
stated that she drew her own scientific conclusions
from analyzing the data and defendant‟s DNA profile
. . . . The court then admitted the report into evidence.177
The New York Court of Appeals held that the DNA report
from the laboratory “consisted of merely machine-generated graphs,
charges and numerical data,” was not testimonial, and did not contain
conclusions or other interpretations.178
The court distinguished this case from Melendez-Diaz and
held that the report from the private laboratory was not testimonial.
In Brown, it was the forensic biologist on the stand, who analyzed
and came to her own conclusions from the data from the private laboratory‟s report that linked the defendant to the crime, unlike in Melendez-Diaz, where the certificates of analysis showed the substance
in the defendant‟s possession was cocaine.179 Therefore, the defendant could directly cross-examine the person linking him to the
crime.180
The court then discussed this case under several noted factors
used in a Crawford analysis:
(1) whether the agency that produced the record is independent of law enforcement; (2) whether it reflects
objective facts at the time of their recording; (3)
whether the report has been biased in favor of law enforcement; and (4) whether the report accuses the defendant by directly linking him or her to the crime.181
177

Id. at 130.
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted). The New York Court of
Appeals previously held in People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008), that “fingerprint analysis was „testimonial‟ because it was prepared by police solely to be entered at the
subsequent trial against the defendant, and it was therefore offered upon a purely accusatory
basis to establish defendant‟s identity at trial.” Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931 (citing Rawlins,
884 N.E.2d at 1033).
179
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
180
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931.
181
Id. (citing People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843, 845-46 (N.Y. 2008)).
178
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Regarding the first factor, the court noted that the private laboratory
was independent of both the police department and District Attorney‟s Office.182 Second, there was no subjective analysis because the
report did not contain any apparent conclusions, interpretations, or
even comparisons.183 Third, the report was produced prior to the defendant being a suspect and thus there could not have been a bias in
favor of law-enforcement.184 Regarding the final guideline, the court
held that unlike the analysis at issue in Melendez-Diaz, it was the testifying analyst who actually linked the defendant to the crime.185
V.

ANALYSIS

After Meekins and Brown, the First Department‟s decision in
Encarnacion is unsurprising.186 The surprising aspect of the ruling is
that the court decided to rule on this case while Bullcoming was
pending before the Supreme Court.187 Many of the arguments discussed in Encarnacion were brought up in Bullcoming, and thus, the
First Department now seems in dispute with the Supreme Court.188
The court in Encarnacion in holding that DNA reports are not
testimonial, relied on Brown and Meekins, in which the New York
Court of Appeals held that DNA reports are not accusatory because
they only contain raw data which is non-identifying in the form of a
DNA profile.189 Consequently, the DNA reports “standing alone
shed no light on the guilt of the accused in the absence of an expert‟s
opinion that the results genetically match a known sample.”190 Similarly, in Bullcoming, the prosecution argued that the witness‟s affir182

Id. at 932.
Id.
184
Id.
185
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931. The court also held that the private laboratory‟s documents
were admissible under New York‟s business records rule. Id. at 932.
186
Compare id. at 931-32 (holding that a DNA analyst‟s testimony, regarding a DNA test
the analyst did not personally perform, was not testimonial), with Encarnacion, 926
N.Y.S.2d at 456 (holding the testimony of a DNA analyst who testified regarding DNA tests
she both did and did not personally conduct was admissible).
187
Compare Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (decided June 23, 2011), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (decided June 23, 2011 with arguments beginning on March 2, 2011).
188
Compare Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (holding that non-identifying raw data is
not accusatory), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (holding that certifying to a machinegenerated number is testimonial).
189
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
190
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1035.
183
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mations were not accusatory.191 In contradiction to Brown and Meekins, the Court in Bullcoming, regarding raw data, stated that the
technician who certifies a test of machine-generated numbers, does
more than merely certify as to the numbers, the technician also certifies that evidentiary procedures and proper protocol were followed.192
Therefore, the human actions taken in the testing procedure are also
shown by a DNA report.193 Accordingly, this shows that the raw data
arguments in Bullcoming are too similar to the arguments in Encarnacion to be simply ignored.
The DNA reports from Encarnacion are testimonial by Supreme Court standards even without citing to Bullcoming. First,
DNA reports fit into the categorical definition of testimonial set out
by Crawford, which says, “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial” are testimonial.194 The technician in Encarnacion worked at the OCME,
knew that the items came from a crime scene, and if not told about
the exact crime could easily deduce that it was a serious crime.195
Similar to the facts in Crawford, the DNA technicians were employees of a government agency that supported the police, though
they were not police.196 Thus, the historical argument from Crawford
which states, “The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte
testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it
was elicited by „neutral‟ government officers,”197 would be violated.
The witness from OCME testified regarding results she had
not personally conducted or supervised;198 therefore, she should not
have been allowed to testify at trial.199 The New York court in Mee191

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2714.
193
Id.
194
Cf. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52) (noting that
the DNA reports used in Crawford, that were collected from the crime scene by police and
sent to a lab for analysis, are similar to Melendez-Diaz, where officers sent what they believed to be drugs to a lab after a drug arrest).
195
See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (describing how the items sent to the lab from
the crime scene contained not only bloody clothing, but also bloody knives; therefore, it
would be a fair assumption to think that a crime was committed).
196
Id.
197
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66.
198
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
199
See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“It would be a differ192
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kins is able to find support for allowing a witness who did not personally conduct the laboratory test through Justice Sotomayor‟s concurring opinion in Bullcoming,200 however, the Encarnacion and Brown
decisions do not.201 Agreeably, the testifying lab technician from Encarnacion is fully aware of the procedures her fellow lab employee
conducted; however, “the [Confrontation] Clause does not tolerate
dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that
questioning one witness about another‟s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”202
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court in Williams v. Illinois203 will finally resolve the DNA issue.204 Based on the decision
in Bullcoming, it seems logical that the Court when deciding Williams will hold that DNA reports are testimonial and cannot be admitted into evidence without confrontation.205 Even federal circuits
that once held DNA test results to be non-testimonial have changed
course after Bullcoming noting that DNA results are at times imperfect.206 Furthermore, regarding forensic testing, the Supreme Court
has noted that “human error can occur at each step”207 and
“[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic analyent case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test testified
about the results or a report about such results.”).
200
Compare Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the
analyst in Bullcoming had no direct involvement in the test and thus was unable to testify,
but, “It would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test testified about the results or a report”), with Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034 (noting that the analyst testifying was the supervisor of the analyst who conducted the test).
201
Compare Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 929 (stating that where the analyst testified regarding the DNA results did not even work at the lab which did the testing), with Encarnacion,
926 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (stating that the analyst who testified regarding DNA results had not
personally conducted all the tests of the results in which she was testifying).
202
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716.
203
131 S. Ct. 2974 (2011).
204
The question on petition for certiorari in Williams is whether Illinois‟s law of allowing
a DNA analyst to testify, regarding a DNA test he or she did not personally perform, violates
the Confrontation Clause.
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 15, 2011, 8:19 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/williams-v-illinois/?wpmp_switcher=desktop.
205
See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst‟s testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment . . . .”).
206
Compare United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[R]aw data
generated by the machines were not the statements of technicians.”), with United States v.
Bonner, 648 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2011) (using arguments from Bullcoming about the
possible errors that could be found in forensic science in comparison with DNA evidence).
207
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711.
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sis.”208 Therefore, it is more than likely that the Supreme Court will
continue its trend and ensure that defendants are protected with confrontation against reports that are made through a process of imperfect human procedures. The Court will do so by ruling that a lab
technician who performed the DNA test must testify, or at the minimum a direct supervisor at trial. The question of how many technicians may a supervisor have under his or her control and still be able
to testify at trial may possibly still be left open after Williams.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the First Department in Encarnacion made two
highly controversial holdings on issues that did not need to be decided.209 First, the court‟s holding continues the decline of what
amounts to clear and convincing in New York. Second, the court‟s
holding now seems to be in contradiction with the Supreme Court‟s
decision in Bullcoming. When the Supreme Court decides the DNA
issue in Williams, it will most likely overrule the decision in Encarnacion.
Anthony Fasano

208

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 457 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that there
was no need to resolve the issue).
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